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A non-parametric efficient statistical method, Random Forests, is implemented for the 
selection of the determinants of Central Bank Independence (CBI) among a large database 
of economic, political, and institutional variables for OECD countries. It permits ranking 
all the determinants based on their importance in respect to the CBI and does not impose a 
priori assumptions on potential nonlinear relationships in the data. Collinearity issues are 
resolved, because correlated variables can be simultaneously considered. 
 
Keywords: Central bank independence, determinants, collinearity, random forests, 
minimal depth 
 
Introduction 
Large panels of economic and financial data are becoming the starting point for 
empirical analysis. Data manipulation tools and techniques, developed for small 
datasets, will become increasingly inadequate. One of these techniques is (linear) 
regression analysis, and although it is widely applied in economic works, it shows 
some drawbacks. The selection of the relevant group of variables from a large 
dataset might bring limitations due to the omitted variables issue and overfitting. It 
is mainly linear and, when necessary, nonlinear terms and interactions should be 
modelled a priori in the parametric model imposing the functional form. 
Collinearity problems are addressed by excluding linearly correlated variables. 
Missing data values are common obstacles that traditional methods cannot handle. 
CAVICCHIOLI ET AL 
3 
An example of empirical research subject to the limitations above is the 
determinants of Central Bank Independence (CBI). A higher degree of CBI is 
associated with lower inflation rates, so that society reduces opposition to inflation 
and public pressure for an independent central bank (Cukierman, 2008, 2013; 
Alesina & Stella, 2011), and the political economy of monetary policymaking 
(DeHaan & Eijffinger, 2016). The balance between flexibility and credibility in 
monetary policymaking determines the equilibrium degree of CBI in a country. The 
trade-off between costs and benefits in delegating the power to manage paper 
money to reduce inflationary bias may depend on many aspects of the economy and 
on its institutional framework (Alesina & Grilli, 1995). This has encouraged the 
study of the determinants that influence the CBI among a large variety of economic 
and institutional variables which cause changes in the degree of commitment of the 
monetary policy (Fernández-Albertos, 2015; D’Amato, Pistoresi, & Salsano, 2009; 
Farvaque, 2002). The usual way to obtain predictions on CBI is based on the linear 
regression framework, given that the economic theory does not provide any 
structural modelling. Furthermore, facing an increasing complexity of the available 
data, this method faces a lot of problems such as omitted variables and overfitting, 
as recently pointed out by Brumm (2011). 
Machine learning has ways to deal with large databases (Varian, 2014). 
Examples include boosting, support vector machines, AdaBoost, genetic 
algorithms (Creamer & Freund, 2010; Emsia & Coskuner, 2016; Gogas, 
Papadimitriou, Matthaiou, & Chrysanthidou, 2015; Zhou & Lai, 2017; Zhang & 
Maringer, 2016), and Random Forests (RFs). An RF is an ensemble learner formed 
by averaging binary tree predictors (Ho, 1995; Breiman, 2001). They are grown 
non-deterministically, without pruning, using a two-step randomization procedure 
and thus resulting in reduced bias. Breiman's RF algorithm was developed for 
classification and regression settings with a variety of applications (Breiman, 2001; 
Cutler et al., 2007). A Random Survival Forest (RSF) is an extension of Breiman's 
RF methodology that can be used for building a prediction model in survival 
analysis (Ishwaran, Kogalur, Blackstone, & Lauer, 2008). In survival settings, the 
predictor is an ensemble formed by combining the results of many survival trees. 
The base learner is a survival tree and the ensemble is a cumulative hazard function 
formed by averaging each tree's Nelson-Aalen's cumulative hazard function. 
Ishwaran, Kogalur, Gorodeski, Minn, and Lauer (2010) developed a high-
dimensional variable selection method based on minimal depth, which avoids 
directly working with prediction error and relies on a theoretical basis. 
RF provides a theoretically-justified variable importance measure and a 
threshold to select and rank predictors. It provides the flexibility to uncover 
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complex data structures, such as dealing with nonlinear effects and interactions 
among multiple types of variables while allowing for effective predictions due to 
the law of large numbers and its two-step randomization approach. Moreover, 
collinearity issues can be handled, since correlated variables can be considered in 
the analysis. Finally, missing values can be dealt automatically, and the 
methodology is applicable to high dimensional settings. 
The problem of variable selection and prediction of CBI is approached via the 
RF method, borrowing features from RSF, such as the minimal depth, in order to 
overcome the drawbacks of linear regression. Particularly, the determinants of CBI 
are selected among 58 economic and institutional variables (see the Appendix for 
a detailed description of the variables), for 24 OECD economies, allowing any kind 
of complexity (e.g., nonlinear relationships). 
Methodology 
In the case of a regression setting (e.g. problems where the response variable is a 
quantitative variable), RSF and RF overlap. 
RF Methodology 
RF trees are formed as described: 
 
Step 1. Draw B bootstrap samples from the original sample. Bootstrap 
samples exclude on average 37% of the data, known as Out-of-Bag 
(OOB) data. 
Step 2. Grow a tree based on the data of each of the bootstrap samples 
b = 1,…, B. 
(a) At each tree node, randomly select a subset of predictor 
variables on which to split. 
(b) Among all binary splits defined by the predictors selected in (a), 
find the best split into two subsets (the daughter nodes) 
according to a suitable splitting criterion. 
(c) Repeat (a), (b) recursively on each daughter node until a 
stopping criterion is met. 
Step 3. Aggregate information from the terminal nodes (nodes with no 
further split) from the B trees to obtain a prediction ensemble 
(predict new data by aggregating the predictions of all trees, i.e. 
majority votes for classification, average for regression). 
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Node splits are a very important step in the algorithm, determined by the 
setting or type of response. For example, in the case of regression or multivariate 
analysis, the default rule is the weighted Mean-Squared Error (MSE) (Breiman, 
Friedman, Stone, & Olshen, 1984, chapter 8.4) or a composite normalized MSE, 
respectively. For classification analysis, the rule is the Gini index (Breiman et al., 
1984, chapter 4.3). For mixed outcomes analysis, a multivariate normalized 
composite split rule of MSE and Gini index splitting is invoked. For survival 
analysis, a log-rank splitting rule is implemented (Segal, 1988; Leblanc & Crowley, 
1993). For competing risk analysis, a modified weighted log-rank splitting rule, 
modeled after Gray's test (Gray, 1988), is implemented. In our case, the MSE was 
used as a splitting criterion. 
An estimate of the prediction error can be obtained based on the OOB data as 
follows: 
 
a. At each bootstrap iteration, predict the OOB data using the tree grown 
with the bootstrap sample. 
b. Aggregate the OOB predictions. Calculate the error rate and call it the 
OOB estimate of error rate (measured via mean-squared-error for 
regression, misclassification error for classification, 1-Harrell's 
concordance index for survival). 
Variable Selection 
In addition to the good prediction performance of the RF methods (RF and RSF), 
they are useful tools for variable selection. They provide measures of variable 
importance (VIMP), calculated for each predictor, so that variables are selected by 
filtering on the basis of their VIMP. The VIMP of a variable is measured by the 
change in the prediction error for the forest ensemble, when OOB data for that 
variable is permuted, while all others are left unchanged. Although there are several 
RF-based methods utilizing VIMP for variable selection, most of these procedures 
are limited. Drawbacks of VIMP-like methods are the following: first, they are 
dependent on the type of prediction error used; and second, a theoretical 
justification is not available. 
In contrast, an alternative way to calculate VIMP, along with a theoretical 
justification for this new variable selection framework, was introduced by Ishwaran 
and Kogalur (2007) and Ishwaran et al. (2008). For VIMP calculation, the variable 
is not permuted. An OOB case is assigned a daughter node randomly whenever a 
split on this variable is encountered in the in-bag tree. The VIMP of a variable is 
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then the prediction error for the original forest subtracted from the prediction error 
for the noised-up forest predictor. In both cases, positive VIMP values (and 
especially largest values) indicate predictive variables. A rigorous approach for 
variable selection via the concept of the maximal subtree and the statistic minimal 
depth is presented. Let T be a binary recursively grown tree; that is, if T has M 
terminal nodes, then T is the function that maps multivariable covariates into those 
terminal nodes. 
 
Definition 1. For each variable v, call Tv a v-subtree of T if the root node of Tv is 
split using v. Call Tv a maximal v-subtree if Tv is not a subtree of a larger v-subtree. 
 
Definition 2. A second order maximal (w, v)-subtree is a maximal w-subtree 
within a maximal v-subtree for a variable v. 
 
Definition 3. Let Dv be the distance from the root node to the root of the closest 
maximal v-subtree for a given v. Then Dv takes values {0,…, D(T)}, where D(T) is 
the depth of T (distance from the root farthest terminal node). Dv is called the 
minimal depth of variable v. 
This means that a maximal subtree of a variable v is defined to be the largest 
subtree whose root node is split using v and no other parent node of the subtree is 
split using v. Maximal subtrees can be used to quantify the predictiveness of a 
variable as well as identify variable interactions. 
 
Theorem 1. Let Dv be the minimal depth of v and πv,j(t) be the probability that v 
is selected as candidate variable for splitting a node t of depth j, assuming no 
maximal v-subtree exists at depth less than j. Let θv,j(t) be the probability that v 
splits a node t of depth j given that v is a candidate variable for splitting t and no 
maximal v-subtree exists at depth less than j. Then for depth d ∈ {0,…, D(T) − 1}, 
it holds 
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where ld is the number of nodes at depth d. 
The minimal depth of a maximal subtree or first order depth (for simplicity, 
depth) equals the shortest distance from the root node to the parent node of the 
maximal subtree. The second order depth is the distance from the root node to the 
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second closest maximal subtree of that variable. The depth measures the 
predictiveness of a variable. The smaller the minimal depth, the more impact a 
variable has on prediction. Additionally, the mean of the minimal depth distribution 
is used as the threshold value for deciding whether a variable's minimal depth value 
is small enough for the variable to be classified as strong. 
Mean Minimal Depth Threshold Rule 
Choose a variable v if its forest-averaged minimal depth, Dv = dv, is less than 
or equal to the mean minimal depth of Dv when v is a noisy variable. The advantage 
of working with the methodology of maximal subtrees and their statistics is that 
they are dimensionless, they are free to any type of prediction error, and they apply 
to all forests settings (survival, classification, and regression). It was extended to 
high-dimensional data. The minimal depth distribution in equation (1) was studied 
under various scenarios and its fairly robust threshold value for identifying strong 
variables imposes an automated variable selection method. 
Random Survival Forests-Like Strategy 
Although a regression setting is examined, this approach could easily be adopted in 
alternative settings. The following steps are implemented with the R software 
package randomSurvivalForest: 
 
a. Grow a random forest to yield regression using a weighted mean squared 
error splitting rule 
b. Implement a random forest variable selection using a tree minimal depth 
methodology to rank all variables in terms of importance in the model 
c. Find the threshold value as the mean of the minimal depth distribution for 
selecting the most predictive variables in the RF model; that is variables 
with minimal depth smaller than the calculated threshold 
Data and Economic Framework 
Theoretical models on CBI suggest a large set of characteristics of a nation's 
economy that cause changes in the degree of independence of the monetary policy, 
e.g. inflation rate, size of the economy, GDP per capita, and various measures of 
efficiency of institutions. Moreover, the inflationary bias has specific features in 
open economies due to the interdependence in the stabilization monetary policy. In 
this context, international business cycle synchronization, the degree of openness, 
and exchange regime are also important (D’Amato et al., 2009). The political 
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economy approaches suggested this institutional innovation should be understood, 
not only in terms of economic efficiency, but also in terms of political convenience, 
adding other potential determinants of CBI. Politically heterogenous contexts, such 
as systems of checks and balance, federal systems, or coalition or multiparty 
governments have incentive to delegate to an independent monetary authority (see 
Fernández-Albertos, 2015). This wide literature has encouraged the study of the 
determinants that influence CBI among the variety of economic, social, and 
institutional variables that cause changes in the degree of commitment of the 
monetary policy. 
Consider the predictors of CBI for 24 OECD economies. In the considered 
period, the countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, 
and the US, over the period 1980-2003. CBI is measured by the legal independence 
index of Cukierman (1992) and updated by Polillo and Guillén (2005) until 2003. 
The 58 predictors are economic, political and institutional determinants of the CBI. 
The economic variables are taken from the International Monetary Fund 
(2009) and the World Bank Group (2008) databases and include: two proxies for 
the world-wide component in the business cycle (i.e. the correlation between the 
GDP growth in each country and the world or US GDP growth); a dummy EMU 
variable, taking the value one in the 1998-2003 period for the countries that joined 
the European Monetary Union after complying with the convergence criteria 
provided for by the Maastricht Treaty; different measures of inflation (i.e. 
current/past inflation and past average inflation); and various measures of 
development (i.e., log real GDP total and real GDP growth rate). For the world 
GDP growth, a weighted average of the growth rates of the economies in the sample 
was used, with weights equal to the GDP levels in each country. The average GDP 
correlation 1960-79 was used to analyze the CBI 1980-91 to reduce the endogeneity 
problem, and the average GDP correlation 1980-92 to study the CBI 1992-2003. 
Moreover, past average inflation of 1960-79 and 1980-92 was used to analyze the 
CBI 1980-91 and CBI 1992-2003, respectively. 
The political and institutional variables are from the DPI2006 database of 
World Bank by Keefer (2007). This database is divided into five different groups: 
1) Chief Executive variables containing variables that are relevant to characterize 
the executive power (e.g., whether countries are presidential or parliamentary; 
number of years in office of the chief executive); 2) Party variables in the legislature 
including those variables relevant to the parties that make up the legislative power 
(e.g., government fractionalization, the number of government/opposition seats; 
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average age of parties); 3) Electoral rules that are relevant to the electoral rules (e.g., 
mean district magnitude; if plurality system; proportional representation); 
4) Stability and checks and balances, containing relevant variables to the stability 
of the political system (e.g., longest/shorter tenure of a veto players) 5) Federalism, 
including variables relevant to the state form (e.g., if there are autonomous regions 
or municipal governments locally elected and whether it is a federal state). 
The political and institutional variables used in the empirical analysis are 
listed below. A detailed definition of each variable can be found in the DPI2006 by 
Keefer (2007). The same definitions hold here when commenting on the results. 
1) Chief Executive variables: system, yrsoff, finittrm, yrcurnt, multpl, allhouse; 
2) Party variables in the legislature: herfgov, govfrac, numgov, numvote, gov1seat, 
gov1vote, gov2seats, gov2vote, gov3seats, gov3vote, govothst, herfopp, oppfrac, 
numopp, oppvote, opp1seat, opp1vote, opp2seat, opp2vote opp3seat, opp3vote, 
oppothst, herftot, frac, oppmajh, maj, partyage, exelec, execspec, govspec, 
coalspec; 3) Electoral rules: liec, mdmh, plurality, pr, housesys; 4) Stability and 
checks and balance: tenlong, tenshort, tenshortlax, checks, stabs, stabns; 
5) Federalism: auton, federal. 
To select the determinants of CBI, the RF is applied. There are few 
suggestions from the economic theory to properly model the underlying 
relationships. Here, minimal depth is used to assess a variable's predictiveness. A 
built-in threshold, which is independent of a priori tuning of parameters, is 
provided for variable selection. Computations were implemented using the freely 
available R software package randomForestSRC (RStudio, 2015; Ishwaran & 
Kogalur, 2007). 
Results 
Reported in Table 1 are the ranked minimal depth (depth) of the selected variables 
based on the RF analysis of the CBI dataset. The model size turns out to be 10, for 
depth threshold equal to 6.08. Another selected variable is time, which indicates the 
temporal variation of some macro-economic variables and it is not commented on 
further. Variable importance (vimp) is also provided (as introduced above), 
confirming depth ordering. The cumulative contribution of the selected variables is 
computed from the normalized variable importance (vimpnorm) (see Grömping, 
2009). The variable emu, which mainly reflects a change in the institutional design 
of monetary policy, is a major determinant (41% of the total variation in CBI), past 
average inflation, business cycles synchronization, and the degree of development 
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explain 16%, 19%, and 4% of the CBI variation, respectively, while political 
variables account for the remaining 20% of the CBI variation. 
The marginal effect of each selected variable on CBI is examined in Figures 
1 and 2. The vertical axis displays the predicted CBI, while each predictor is plotted 
on the horizontal axis. The dummy emu suggests that participation in the Euro (emu 
equal to 1 in Figure 1) implies a greater CBI: it encourages the individual countries 
to change the institutional design of the monetary policy in view of greater price 
stability. 
 
 
Table 1. Minimal depth and variable importance (denoted by vimp, vimpnorm when 
normalized) obtained from RSF analysis of CBI dataset; the latter includes 59 variables 
for 24 OECD countries and spans from 1980 to 2003, as described in a previous section; 
the selection of 10 variables comes from a depth threshold equal to 6.08 
 
Series depth vimp vimpnorm 
emu 1.4440 0.0280 0.4080 
averageinfl 3.0120 0.0110 0.1580 
world cycle 3.3400 0.0070 0.1000 
usa cycle 3.6230 0.0060 0.0920 
mdmh 4.2590 0.0050 0.0690 
numgov 4.7050 0.0040 0.0510 
logrealgdp 5.3920 0.0020 0.0350 
gov1seat 5.4820 0.0030 0.0360 
numopp 5.5540 0.0020 0.0260 
opp1seat 6.0010 0.0020 0.0230 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Marginal effect plot of the dummy variable emu on the CBI index 
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Figure 2. Marginal effect plots of the predictor variables avergeinfl, WORLD CYCLE, 
USA CYCLE, logrealgdp, mdmh, numgov, numopp, gov1seat, opp1seat on the predicted 
CBI index shown by the curves; each country’s mean predictor value is displayed with 
vertical line marks at the horizontal axis 
 
 
The predicted smoothed curves in Figure 2 suggest the prevalent positive or 
negative behavior of the selected variables towards CBI given the mean predictor 
values of each country (ticks at the bottom). Nonlinearity of the variable past 
average inflation (denoted by averageinfl) is recognized; in fact, the relation with 
CBI stays negative when the level of inflation is up to 6-7%, and changes sign 
afterwards. However, there exists a dominant negative relation suggested by the 
accumulation of points (countries) to the left side of the averageinfl graph in Figure 
2. This fact supports the idea stressed by Cukierman (1992) that inflation leads to 
the evolution of automatic accommodative mechanisms such as indexation of 
contracts in the labor and capital markets to the general price level. Society reduces 
opposition to inflation and public pressure for an independent central bank. 
Then, an almost linear and positive behavior can be detected for the two 
variables regarding synchronization of business cycles (WORLD CYCLE and USA 
CYCLE). The larger the size of the common component in the business cycle in 
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the countries, the larger the CBI. To understand this result, consider that 
governments expect their economies to be in the same state of the world (boom or 
slumps) as foreign economies. Governments in each country have a strategic 
incentive to commit monetary policy in order to free ride on the stabilization 
provided abroad and gain credibility at home. Hence, the larger the correlation 
among shocks, the larger the incentives to commitment, i.e. the larger the CBI (see 
D’Amato & Martina, 2005). 
From the point of view of the inflationary bias approach to monetary policy, 
the impact of per capita GDP is not clear-cut. The real GDP per capita (logrealgdp) 
is found to be linearly and positively linked to CBI. On the one hand, a higher level 
of per capita income level entails a lower degree of (real and financial) market 
failures in the economy, a more efficient fiscal system, and therefore a lower 
incentive to create inflation for the central banker. On the other hand, economic 
agents in high-income countries might be better hedged against inflation; hence, 
their inflation aversion may be lower (Campillo & Miron, 1997). Opposite effects 
on the inflationary bias in monetary policy entail opposite effects on the incentives 
to precommit monetary policy. The real GDP per capita is considered to be an 
indicator of a general measure of development. In Romer (1993), a larger per capita 
GDP has a negative impact on inflation, i.e. lower inflationary bias. The reduced 
inflationary bias lowers the incentive to commit with negative impact on the level 
of independence of the central bank. Lane (1997) and Campillo and Miron (1997) 
obtained a positive sign for the log per capita GDP on average inflation. Hence, the 
present outcome is not consistent with the commitment interpretation of the results 
in Romer, but it is in line with Campillo and Miron’s argument. 
Also, the relationship between political instability and the level of dependence 
is not clear-cut in the commitment literature. The high variability of the political 
environment may imply a lower ability to achieve commitment of monetary policy 
through delegation to an independent institution. However, a larger political 
instability may increase the benefits of commitment. From an empirical point of 
view, the relation between political instability and CBI is ambiguous and mainly 
depends on the variable used to proxy instability. For example, Cukierman (1992) 
predicted and empirically verified a high level of party-political instability induces 
a larger level of independence, whereas the political instability regime has a 
negative effect on CBI. A partial list of similar studies, in which different measures 
of political instability and several indices of CBI are used, includes de Haan and 
van't Hag (1995), Habibi and Bagheri (1997), and Farvaque (2002). Broadly 
speaking, the literature on the political economy approach to CBI suggests a 
politically heterogeneous context (federal systems, strong systems of checks and 
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balance, coalition and multiparty governments) pushes for the adoption of 
independent central banks (see Fernández-Albertos, 2015).  
Among the political variables, the following are found to be relevant: the 
mean district magnitude (mdmh), the number of government and opposition seats 
(numgov and numopp), and the number of seats of the largest government party 
and of the largest opposition party (gov1seats and opp1seats). An increase in district 
magnitude induces a higher CBI, given the accumulation of country-points in the 
first bit of the curve. The rationale behind this outcome is that an increase in district 
magnitude tends to increase the number of parties and party system fragmentation 
(Rae, 1995); so, the larger the heterogeneity in policy preferences, the larger the 
CBI. 
Similar results are obtained for the government and the opposition parties. 
The larger the number of government seats, makes the policy making more difficult 
and induces a greater incentive to delegate to an independent central. A similar 
argument holds for the number of opposition seats. Moreover, the larger the first 
government party, the smaller the CBI, while the larger the first opposition party, 
the greater the CBI. This is even clearer when taking into account the relative 
weight, in terms of number of seats, for these two parties, focusing on the nonlinear 
behavior in Figure 2. In fact, up to about 100 seats, the effect on CBI is positive 
(resp. negative) for gov1seat (resp. opp1seat) while it is negative (resp. positive) 
for a number larger than 100. In general, the larger the fragmentation of the 
government or party system, the larger the CBI index. 
Conclusion 
The random forests (RFs) method was implemented to identify the main 
determinants of the Central Bank Independence (CBI) index from a large database 
of institutional, political, and economic variables. To the best of our knowledge, 
RF has not been previously used for the identification of CBI determinants, 
although it has been utilized in finance (e.g., Creamer & Freund, 2010; De Luca, 
Rivieccio, & Zuccolotto, 2010; Booth, Gerding, & McGroarty, 2015; Ward, 2017). 
RF has been utilized to overcome limitations such as omitted variables, collinearity, 
overfitting, and linear functional form of the regression. 
Considering multicollinearity in regression analysis directly bears on whether 
the coefficients of the model are uniquely identified. This can be problematic from 
an inferential view: if two variables are correlated, increases in the first variable 
may be offset by decreases in the second one (and vise versa), so the combined 
effect is to negate each other. On the other hand, a regularization is performed in 
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RF through the number of variables sampled at each split. The larger the number 
of features to choose from, the better splits one can obtain. That also makes each 
tree more highly correlated with the others, somewhat moderating the diversifying 
effect of estimating multiple trees in the first place. Importantly, no part of the RF 
is harmed by highly collinear variables. If two variables provide the same child 
node purity, one of them may be picked without diminishing the quality of the result. 
The original paper of Breiman (2001) discusses those issues in detail; however, 
further studies focus on those advantages of RF, such as Kimes (2006), Dormann 
et al. (2013), and Kane, Price, Scotch, and Rabinowitz (2014). 
Variable selection is efficiently performed, and new implications are derived 
with respect to the empirical literature on CBI. The analysis shows that the 
economic variables account for 80% of the variation in CBI, while the ones 
reflecting party system's fragmentation explain the remaining 20%. Two-thirds of 
the explained variation due to the economic group is attributed to external 
constraints, that is, international business cycle and the participation in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). Moreover, half of the selected predictors 
interact nonlinearly with the CBI index, for example average inflation and the 
number of party seats. Such an empirical strategy turns out to be particularly 
important when a clear structural model is not available to the researcher, as in this 
specific economic problem. 
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Appendix: Political and institutional variables from the 
DPI2006 database of World Bank by Keefer (2006) 
1) Chief Executive Variables: 
system: it indicates the type of the political system. Its values are: 0 if the system 
is presidential, 1 if the president is assembly elected, 2 if it is parliamentary 
yrsoffc: it indicates how many years the chief executive has been in office 
finittrm: it’s a dummy that indicates if there is finite term in the office (1) or if 
there is not (0) 
yrcurnt: it indicates the years left in the current term 
multpl: it indicates when there are formal restraints on an executive’s term (NA 
if not), if he can serve additional terms following the current one (1) or not (0) 
allhouse: it indicates if the party of the executive controls (1) or not (0) one of the 
relevant houses 
2) Party variables in the legislature: 
herfgov: it is the Herfindahl index of the government, i.e., the sum of the squared 
seat shares of all parties in the government 
govfrac: it is the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties 
numgov: it indicates the number of total parliament seats held by government 
parties 
numvote: it indicates the vote share of government parties 
gov1seat: it indicates the seats of the first government party 
gov1vote: it indicates the vote share of the first government party 
gov2seat: it indicates the seats of the second government party 
gov2vote: it indicates the vote share of the second government party 
gov3seat: it indicates the seats of the third government party 
gov3vote: it indicates the vote share of the third government party 
govothst: it indicates the seats of the other government parties 
herfopp: it is the Herfindahl index of the opposition, calculated in the same 
manner as the Herfindahl government 
oppfrac: it is the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
opposition parties will be of different parties 
numopp: it indicates the number of opposition seats 
oppvote: it is the vote share of opposition parties 
opp1seat: it indicates the seats of the first opposition party 
opp1vote: it indicates the vote share of the first opposition party 
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opp2seat: it indicates the seats of the second opposition party 
opp2vote: it indicates the vote share of the second opposition party 
opp3seat: it indicates the seats of the third opposition party 
opp3vote: it indicates the vote share of the third opposition party 
oppothst: it indicates the seats of the other opposition parties 
herftot: it is the Herfindahl total index, calculated in the same manner as the 
Herfindahl of the government and Herfindahl of the opposition 
frac: it is the probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature 
will be of different parties 
oppmajh: it is a dummy, which is 1 if the opposition party has an absolute 
majority in House 
maj: it is the margin of majority, i.e., the fraction of seats held by the government, 
calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total (government plus 
opposition plus non-aligned) seats 
partyage: it is the average of the ages of the first government party, second 
government party and first opposition party or the subset of these for which age 
of party is known 
exelec: this variable indicates if there is (1) or not (0) an executive election in the 
current year 
execspec: it is a dummy which is 1 if there is executive party special interest 
govspec: it is a dummy which is 1 if there is first government party special interest 
coalspec: it is a dummy which is 1 if there are any coalition parties’ special 
interest 
3) Electoral rules: 
liec: it is an index of electoral competitiveness: it goes from 1 to 7, and an 
increasing value corresponds to a decreasing vote share of the largest party  
mdmh: it represents the weighted average of the number of representatives 
elected by each constituency size 
pluralty: it has a value equal to 1 if the legislative election winner takes the 
majority of the seats, and it’s 0 otherwise 
pr: it has a value equal to 1 if there is proportional representation in legislative 
elections, 0 otherwise 
housesys: it deals with electoral rules: is equal to 1 if the majority of seats are 
assigned with plurality rules, and it’s 0 if they are assigned with proportional rules 
4) Stability and checks and balance: 
tenlong: it measures the tenure of veto player with the longest tenure 
tenshort and tenshortlax: they measure the tenure (years) of the veto player with 
the shortest tenure; their difference depends on the numbers of veto players. 
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checks: it indicates the number of veto players 
stabs: it counts the percent of veto players who drop from the government in any 
given year 
5) Federalism: 
auton: it is a dummy which is 1 if there are autonomous regions 
federal: it takes value 0 if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally 
elected, 1 if the executive is appointed, but the legislature elected, 2 if they are 
both locally elected. 
